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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming truly ubiq-
uitous in our everyday life, but it also faces unique security
challenges. Intrusion detection is critical for the security and
safety of a wireless IoT network. This paper discusses the
human-in-the-loop active learning approach for wireless intrusion
detection. We first present the fundamental challenges against
the design of a successful Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for
wireless IoT network. We then briefly review the rudimentary
concepts of active learning and propose its employment in the
diverse applications of wireless intrusion detection. Experimental
example is also presented to show the significant performance
improvement of the active learning method over traditional
supervised learning approach. While machine learning tech-
niques have been widely employed for intrusion detection, the
application of human-in-the-loop machine learning that leverages
both machine and human intelligence to intrusion detection of
IoT is still in its infancy. We hope this article can assist the
readers in understanding the key concepts of active learning and
spur further research in this area.
Index Terms—Internet of things, intrusion detection, active
learning, human-in-the-loop machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT refers to a network of connected physical devices that
are embedded with software, sensors, electronics, and commu-
nication modules. The IoT allows the physical objects to be
sensed and controlled remotely over network infrastructure and
consequently enable direct integration of the physical world
with computing devices. The IoT can help to improve the
efficiency, reliability, and accuracy of existing systems and
has received significant research interest recently.
Wireless communications techniques such as NB-IoT, WiFi,
Bluetooth Low Energy have become the de facto standard for
connecting IoT devices due to its flexibility, low cost, and
simple installation and maintenance processes. These wireless
devices can be simply installed in offices or factories to
provide seamless connectivity. In addition, the commercial 5G
network is anticipated to be launched by the end of 2020,
which together with LTE, LTE-A, and WiFi, could provide
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high-rate coverage as well as harmonious quality of service
for every user.
Several papers (e.g., [1]–[3]) have studied related IoT se-
curity issues. In spite of the low cost and flexibility, the IoT
come with unique vulnerabilities than traditional networks and
consequently face a variety of security challenges, such as
the DoS attacks. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) plays a
key role in detecting network attacks. However, the IoT have
some major characteristics such as the sensor nodes are usually
power-limited, have limited memory space, and the capacity
of wireless channels is very limited. In addition, each node in
IoT has an IP address so that any user can interact with the IoT
node from anywhere in the world, which makes it particularly
vulnerable to cyber security attacks. Such challenges make the
design of the IoT IDS different from the traditional network
IDS.
Intrusion detection technologies can be broadly grouped
into three categories, namely the misuse-based methods, the
anomaly-based methods, and the hybrid methods [4], [5]. The
misuse-based method first constructs a collection of signatures
based on information such as domain knowledge and expert
experience. It then tries to look for a particular pattern in the
incoming network data that closely matches one or multiple
signatures in the database. The misuse-based method can
effectively detect intrusions matching at least one of the
signatures in the database and thus has low false-positive
rate. However, it cannot detect unknown intrusions that do not
match any pattern in the database, and consequently may give
rise to high false-negative rate, especially when the attacker is
aware of signatures in the database. As a remedy, the misuse-
based IDS often needs to frequently update the signatures and
rules in the database.
The anomaly-based method first learns the normal network
behaviors and then identifies anomalies that do not com-
ply with the normal network conditions. The anomaly-based
method can effectively detect unknown attacks that do not
happen before. In addition, since the normal network behaviors
are learned by the machine and in most cases no explicit rules
for intrusion detection are provided, it is less likely for the
attackers to learn the rules and make their attacking strategies
undetectable. The main disadvantage of the anomaly-based
method is that it may generate a huge volume of false alarms
because any previously unseen behaviors can be treated as
anomalies.
The hybrid approach aims to combine the misuse-based and
anomaly-based methods and thereby achieve the advantages of
both. In reality, most IDS systems employ a hybrid approach
to strike a balance between the false-positive rate and false-
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
01
41
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  4
 A
ug
 20
18
2negative rate.
One goal of machine learning is to let computers learn from
and make predictions based on observed data without being
explicitly programmed. While machine learning techniques
have been extensively studied for anomaly detection, their
applications to intrusion detection in practice are relatively
limited. This is partly because the design of intrusion detection
system in practice often lacks sufficient training data and also
requires domain knowledge of the particular system under
investigation.
Active learning is a subfield of machine learning that em-
phasizes on learning from limited amount of training samples
[6]. It is naturally suited for the design of IDS since providing
labels for intrusion detection is usually time-consuming. In
some cases, labeling is impossible for intrusion that never
happens before. In short, active learning can harness the
power of machine learning together with the experience from
domain expert. Consequently, it can significantly decrease
the labeling efforts and quickly build a machine learning
model for intrusion detection. In addition, the active learning
framework allows quick update of the machine learning model
and therefore can be updated in a short period of time for new
network attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II is devoted to the intrusion detection of wireless IoT network.
In Section III, we overview the rudimentary concepts of active
learning and the query strategies. An example of applying
active learning method to the intrusion detection problem is
also provided. We conclude our discussion in Section IV.
II. INTRUSION DETECTION FOR WIRELESS INTERNET OF
THINGS
Intrusion detection aims at detecting harmful activities made
by internal or external intruders against the system. Typi-
cal intrusions include information gathering, eavesdropping,
harmful packet forwarding, packet dropping, hole attacks etc.
To detect these intrusions, an IDS is often designed with a
powerful detection engine, a reporting module along with a
group of sensors, where the sensors are deployed to gather
data and monitor the system, the engine analyzes the gathered
data to detect suspicious activities, and once an intrusion is
detected, the reporting module will generate an alert for further
neutralizing the attack [5].
The IoT has some major characteristics. Firstly, unlike the
wireless sensor networks, the IoT has a novel architecture
that there always exists an edge node, i.e. border router, that
connects the IoT network with the Internet. This architecture
can be utilized in building centralized or hybrid IDSs. Sec-
ondly, the sensor nodes in IoT are directly connected to the
untrusted Internet and globally identified by their IP addresses
which make the IoT more vulnerable to intrusions from the
Internet. Lastly, the IoT nodes are resource-constrained and
connected through lossy links. How to effectively exploit these
opportunities and threats makes the building of IDS for the IoT
a very challenging work.
As shown in Figure 1, depending on the placement strate-
gies, the IDSs can be classified into centralized, distributed,
and hybrid, where the hybrid systems can be furthered cate-
gorized into clustered and CEO-structured.
1) Centralized IDS for IoT: A centralized IDS usually
deploys its agent in a master node with powerful computation
resource and large storage/memory space. This master node
must also have the ability to monitor all the activities in
the network, so that the deployed IDS agent can access the
network activity data in real time and detect intrusions by
analyzing the network activities instantaneously.
The centralized IDSs are easy to implement in the IoT
partially because the IoT system naturally has an edge node
(i.e. border router) that connects the IoT network with the
Internet. Network intrusions from external intruders can be
better detected by the centralized IDS agent since all outside
packets have to be sent to the edge node, and the attack
can be mitigated by simply dropping the harmful packets
sending from the malicious intruders at the edge node. On
the other hand, detecting intrusions from internal intruders
might be hard for centralized IDSs since it requires the IDS
agent to deeply monitor actions of resource limited sensor
nodes through lossy networks. Meanwhile, although border
routers usually have a more powerful processor than the sensor
nodes connected to it, computation cost, energy consumption,
and memory usage are still the top considerations when the
IDSs are installed in the IoT. Besides the strength in detecting
external intrusions, the centralized IDSs are also capable of de-
tecting some internal attacks such as the selective forwarding
attack, in which malicious nodes selectively forward packets
to disrupt routing paths.
2) Distributed IDS for IoT: Unlike the centralized scheme,
a distributed IDS deploys detection agents in every sensor
node. Each agent monitors and analyzes the behaviors of its
neighboring nodes within its radio range and generates alerts
if it observes abnormal activities. The decision of whether or
not a node is compromised can be made either by the local
agent’s own analysis, which is called individualized decision-
making, or by the majority votes of all neighboring agents,
which is called cooperative decision-making.
The distributed IDSs have a strength in detecting internal
intrusions. Besides, the deployment of the distributed IDS does
not rely on a super powerful central node, all sensor nodes
with detection agents in the IoT can work collaboratively
to detect potential attacks, hence the system is more robust
in the sense that accidents causing one node to malfunction
will not be detrimental to the wireless IoT network as a
whole. However, the distributed IDS techniques are usually
not energy-efficient because the IDS agents are installed in
every node, which increases the total computation cost and
incurs extra communication cost for cooperation. In building
distributed IDSs for IoT, the designer must pay special atten-
tion to the energy consumption on each individual agent since
the detection agents will be installed on sensor nodes with
limited power, memory space, and computing capability. The
economic cost should also be taken into consideration because
deploying detection agents will affect the battery life of the
sensor nodes in the IoT.
3) Hybrid IDS for IoT: By synthesizing the centralized
strategy and distributed strategy, the hybrid placement strategy
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Fig. 1. Placement strategies of intrusion detection.
seeks for a tradeoff among detection accuracy, algorithm com-
plexity, energy consumption, memory and computing power
usage, communication cost, and other design requirements.
The nodes being selected to host IDS agents are often more
robust and powerful. The hybrid placement strategy can be
further categorized into clustered and CEO-structured.
In the clustered placement, the network is organized into
clusters, where a cluster head is selected from each cluster,
and deployed with the IDS agent. For example, the cluster
heads can overhear and monitor their neighbor nodes’ packet
transmission [7]. A specification-based detection algorithm is
then applied, where the overheard packets are compared to the
abnormal behaviors (set of rules) which are manually defined.
In clustered IDSs, clustering algorithms may consume con-
siderable amount energy through the formation of the clusters.
On the contrast, the CEO-structured IDSs, without requiring
any preprocessing to classify the nodes, utilize the natural
hierarchy of the IoT to place a central processing agent often in
the border router node, and all other agents in those resource-
constrained sensor nodes. The central processing agent in
the border router is in charge of tasks that demand high
computation capacity and memory usage, while the agents
deployed in constrained nodes are lightweight.
III. ACTIVE LEARNING FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
Machine Learning (ML) deals with the problem of ex-
tracting features from data to solve predictive tasks, such
as classification, regression, clustering, and decision making.
Classic ML algorithms usually involve no human effort other
than some data preprocessing and feature selecting work.
However, the performance of applying automated ML can be
severely constrained due to the lack of clean data, meanwhile,
in some learning tasks where data is limited, human experts
can show very competitive results. To overcome the difficulty
of data insufficiency and reduce the long processing time
in ML, a human-in-the-loop scheme is introduced, which
typically utilizes guidance of domain experts to adjust and
optimize the learning behaviors in the training phase. It is
believed that bringing human experience in the ML loop would
greatly enhance the knowledge discovery process, therefore
achieving better results than classic ML algorithms.
A. Active Learning
Active learning is a subfield of human-in-the-loop machine
learning where humans play the role of “omniscient” to label
the selected data. In many real learning problems, obtaining
unlabeled data is much less expensive than labeled data,
meanwhile, data are not evenly useful for a learning method in
the sense that some of them are dirty, redundant or trivial. To
address these issues, the active learning technique is proposed.
It is designed to achieve high accuracy using as few labeled
instances as possible, thereby minimizing the cost of obtaining
labeled data [6]. As shown in Figure 2, a classical active
learning system contains a select query, a human annotator and
a machine learning model. The select query selects unlabeled
data based on certain strategies. A human annotator, then
labels the selected data and adds it into the training set. The
learning model adjusts its parameters every time it receives
new labeled data. The whole learning process stops when
the system achieves desired prediction accuracy. It is showed
by both empirical study and theoretical analysis that, by
carefully selecting data to label, active learning can achieve
same accuracy with much fewer labeled data than classic ML
algorithms.
Active learning can be classified into stream-based selective
sampling scheme and pool-based sampling scheme. In stream-
based selective sampling, the data will first be sampled one
at a time from the actual distribution, then the learner can
decide for each sampled data, whether to request its label
or discard it. In pool-based sampling, all unlabeled data are
gathered in a data pool, then the query engine will select a data
instance from the pool and send it to the human annotator. The
decision of whether or not to discard a data in the stream-based
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Fig. 2. An illustration of active learning.
method, as well as the selection of instance in the pool-based
method, usually follows certain query strategies, which all aim
at accelerating the learning process. In the remaining of this
section, we will first go over some general frameworks of
query strategies that follow the categorizing method of [6],
we will then review some works of applying active learning
in building IDSs, finally, we will give an example of applying
active learning in building IoT IDS specifically.
B. Query Strategies of Active Learning
Typical query strategies include uncertainty sampling,
query-by-committee, expected model change etc. We first give
a brief review in the sequel.
1) Uncertainty Sampling: Motivated by results in com-
putational learning theory, the uncertainty sampling strategy
queries the instance which is least certain to label under the
current model. The most uncertain samples are expected to be
the most informative and are capable of improving the model
most [6].
When probabilistic learning models are in use, the meaning
of uncertainty is very straightforward: the posterior probability
of an instance belonging to a certain class represents the
confidence of classifying the instance to that class, hence
uncertainty sampling strategy tends to select a instance of
which the learning model is unconfident to classify to any
class. For binary classification problems, it is the instance with
posterior probability of being positive closest to 0.5 [8].
More generally, the uncertainty can be evaluated under dif-
ferent criteria, e.g., entropy, least confident of prediction, and
least margin. The entropy criterion selects the instance with the
highest Shannon information entropy. The least confident of
prediction selects the instance achieving the min-max posterior
probability. The least margin criterion selects the one with
minimum difference of posterior probabilities between the first
and second most probable class. It is also possible to apply
uncertainty sampling in non-probabilistic classifiers.
2) Query-by-Committee: The Query-by-Committee (QBC)
strategy, considers learning by committee setup, where each
member in the committee represents a learning model or a
hypothesis. The hypotheses that fit the labeled training data
formed the version space. By viewing the learning problem
as a search for the best hypothesis that describes the data in
the version space, the active learning problem then becomes
to shrink the version space with the least amount of new
labeled data. For each selected data instance, the hypotheses
committee will vote on the class it belongs to. The selected
data instance is chosen according to the principle of max-
imal disagreement among the committee members [9]. The
committee of models will be trained on the new labeled data
instances.
To measure the disagreement, the vote entropy metric and
average Kullback-Leibler divergence metric are often used.
The vote entropy views the voted class as a random variable
with a probability of being class c equals to the portion of
committee members that labeling the instance to c under the
current model, and then uses Shannon information entropy
to measure the uncertainty of labeling this instance. The
averaged KL divergence measured an average distance of
each committee member’s labeling to the whole committee’s
labeling. Instead of picking one class per committee member
deterministically, a soft vote may also be applied in the
QBC strategy where each member outputs its posterior label
probability/confidence vectors.
3) Expected Model Change: The expected model change
strategy uses a decision-theoretic approach. Under this query
framework, the data instance that changes the current model
parameters (i.e. gradient) most will be selected. The model’s
change is most commonly measured by Expected Gradient
Length (EGL), which can be broadly used for any gradient
descent learning methods [10].
For each instance, new gradient can be computed after the
instance is labeled and added into the training set. However,
since the true label is not aware in the query phase, the
expectation of the new gradient over all possible labels will
be computed. The data instance with the largest expected
gradient will be selected. The expected model change strategy
prefers instance that has the largest influence on the model,
hence could avoid labeling redundant data. However, the major
drawback is that, the feature space in real problems may not
be isotropic, hence an ill-conditioned feature component may
severely decrease the system performance.
4) Expected Error Reduction: The expected error reduction
strategy also uses a decision-theoretic approach, measures how
much its generalization error will be reduced. Under this query
strategy, a model will first be trained for each data instance
along with the existed labeled training set, then the expected
error of the remained unlabeled instances tested in this model
will be calculated. The data instance with the minimized
expected loss will be selected. The 0/1-loss metric and the
log-loss metric are usually considered. The expected error re-
duction strategy with a log-loss metric can also be interpreted
as seeking for data instance that minimizing the expected
entropy over the unlabeled set or maximizing the expected
information gain of the query. The major constraint of using
the expected error reduction strategy is the computation cost
in the process of model re-training and error estimation for
each data instance.
5) Variance Reduction: Due to the huge computational
cost of model re-training and error estimation, it is hard to
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reduce the expected error indirectly by minimizing the output
variance, which for some scenarios, can be formalized to a
differentiable function. For these scenarios, gradient method
can be used to find the best query instead of testing all
unlabeled instances, which could speed up the learning process
significantly.
6) Information Density: Outliers are very easy to be lead
into the training set in the querying frameworks such as
uncertainty sampling, QBC, and EGL. The reason is that
these strategies are only interested in selecting the less certain
instances, however, the selected instances may lie on the tail
of the distribution hence are not representative to the other
instances.
To solve this problem, the information density is introduced
to modify the base querying strategy. In the density strategy,
the evaluated metric of the base querying strategy will be
modified by the data instance representativeness, where the
representativeness is measured by the closeness of this data
instance to all other instances. By using the density strategy,
the system will select those instances with a balance on
informativeness and representativeness.
C. Active Learning in Intrusion Detection
In machine-learning-based intrusion detection techniques,
detection models are trained from the training data set which
includes both attack data and normal data. These models must
be updated periodically, in order to improve the intrusion
detection performance and recognize new attack types on the
basis of the previous results. However, the major drawback of
applying machine learning in IDS is that it usually requires a
large amount of labeled training data whereas in many of the
intrusion detection scenarios, obtaining adequate attack data
is always time-consuming and greatly relies on the domain
experts. This is particularly challenging for designing IDS
for wireless IoTs since IoT devices are of limited power,
memory space, and computing capabilities. Furthermore, the
limited wireless channel capacities between various wireless
IoT nodes render the collection of a large amount of training
data impossible. It is therefore especially difficult to collect a
large amount of intrusion data from wireless IoT network.
By selecting the most “useful” unlabeled data in the query-
ing phase, active learning effectively integrates the power of
machine learning and the experience of domain expert, greatly
reduces the labeling cost, and significantly accelerates the
training process, which helps the machine-learning-based IDS
better meet the design requirements such as resource limita-
tion, detection response time, and system updating period.
Consider the structural simplicity and computational effi-
ciency, the uncertainty sampling is the most commonly used
querying framework in active-learning-based IDSs. In the
uncertainty sampling strategy, the IDS selects the data instance
that the system is least confident about, and hence requires the
human expert to help labeling. This data instance, after being
labeled by a human expert, will be added into the training set
to update the IDS.
For probabilistic learning models, the uncertainty can be
measured under many criteria, such as entropy, least confi-
dent of prediction, and least margin. For binary classification
problems, the system seeks for a data instance whose pos-
terior probability of being attacked is nearest to 0.5. Non-
probabilistic models such as Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and Neural Network (NN) can also be utilized for intrusion
detection problems [11], [12].
Although uncertainty sampling shows great promise in
active learning based IDS due to its simple structure and low
computational cost, other query strategies such as QBC and
information density can also be considered. For example, the
diversity query strategy can be used along with the uncertainty
sampling in payload-based anomaly detection problems [13].
In the sequel, it is seen that by only selectively labeling a
small portion of the entire data set, the detection rate can be
significantly increased.
D. Active Learning for Wireless IoT Intrusion Detection
Although many machine learning techniques have been used
in building IDSs, there exist limited amount of literatures
related to active learning for intrusion detections, among which
most works employ uncertainty sampling as the selected cri-
terion. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work discusses
the active learning in building IoT IDSs.
We next present an example of employing active learning
approach for intrusion detection. In this active-learning-based
method, we first employ an unsupervised local outlier factor
method to detect anomalies in the data set. Then the active
learning algorithm is applied. The active learning algorithm
iteratively runs three steps, i.e., supervised learning, label
selection, labeling by the expert labeler, until it reaches a
threshold of performance in terms of precision and recall.
In this case, we set precision and recall both greater than
99% as the exiting condition, and employ XGBoost [14] and
the uncertainly sampling as the supervised learning algorithm
and the label selection criterion respectively. XGBoost is an
efficient extreme gradient boosting algorithm that can be used
for classification. Compared to other machine learning models
such as neural networks, XGBoost has fewer parameters,
leading to a simpler structure. Also, current open source
XGBoost implementation is scalable, portable, and distributed.
Therefore, it is naturally suited for IoT platforms where
computation and memory resources are strictly constrained.
As shown in Figure 3, we compare the performance of the
active learning for intrusion detection with the random-select
method in the experiment. 80% and 20% of data is chosen
to be the training set and the testing set, respectively. KDD
1999 dataset is used in the study. It is seen that compared with
the random-select method, the proposed active-learning-based
method reaches the required performance much quicker than
the random one. Also, the total number of labeled instances is
reduced to almost one third to achieve the same performance,
which significantly reduces the labeling time and efforts.
As another example, we have studied the performance of the
proposed active learning method for the AWID [15] dataset,
which is obtained in a real WiFi environment. It is seen from
Figure 4 that the proposed method outperforms the random-
select method significantly. It can quickly build a machine
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Fig. 3. Experiment results (KDD 99 Dataset) of using (a) the active learning method, and (b) the random selection method.
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Fig. 4. Experiment results (AWID Dataset) of using (a) the active learning method, and (b) the random selection method.
learning model for intrusion detection with a small portion of
the labeled data.
While active learning is particularly suitable for IDSs of
wireless IoTs, there exist a few challenges that remain to be ad-
dressed. Firstly, the wireless IoT devices are of limited power,
memory, and computing resources. It remains unknown how
to efficiently collect the training data from such a resource-
constrained distributed system. Secondly, there are a number
of query strategies for the active learning, but which query
strategy is best suited for the design of IDS for wireless IoT
network? Finally, the obtained machine learning model for
intrusion detection should be updated periodically when the
network behaviors evolve according to the changing environ-
ments. How can the active learning approach be adaptively
incorporated in these updates?
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the active learning approach for intrusion
detection of wireless IoT networks. Background of network
intrusion detection has been provided with emphasis on the
unique security challenges faced by wireless IoT networks.
We have further discussed how to apply the active learning
framework to intrusion detection of a wireless IoT network.
Experimental results have been presented and discussed. It is
seen that the active learning method can effectively improve
the performance over the traditional supervised learning tech-
niques for intrusion detection. While active machine learning
techniques have found a variety of applications in diverse
areas, there exists limited amount of work on active learning
for intrusion detection of wireless IoT networks. On the other
hand, the increasing amount and the complexity of network
data make the labeling process tedious and time-consuming.
It is therefore crucial to reduce the labeling efforts and speed
up the process of training and updating the machine learning
model. We hope this work on active learning for wireless
intrusion detection can draw attentions from researchers in
machine learning as well as wireless security and spur further
research efforts in this area.
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